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Do Codification and Private International Law Leave
Room for a New Law Merchant?
Mark D. Rosen*
Imagine that merchants from two different countries-let us say the
United States and France-enter into a contract. What law governs their
transnational business transaction? One possibility is the law of some countryfor instance, the law of the country of which one of the merchants is a citizen,
or perhaps the law of a third country that both merchants have selected.
Alternatively, their contract could be governed by a distinctive body of
international business law that is not tied to any single nation-state. Such a body
of law has been variously dubbed the "new law merchant" and "modern lex
mercatoria"by many of its contemporary proponents.'
Though a rose by any other name may still be a rose, the moniker lex
mercatoria has proven to be of particular significance within the scholarly
community. One group of scholars has claimed that a distinctive body of
merchant law known as lex mercatoria dates back to the middle ages, if not to
Roman times. 2 This distinguished historical pedigree has been used to bolster the
case for the new law merchant.3 Others have challenged the linkage between the
new law merchant and the lex mercatoria of old by arguing that there is no
historical evidence that there ever was a law merchant.4 If true, this would mean
that there is no precedent with which the new law merchant can ally itself.
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Associate Professor, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology. I would like
to give special thanks to Lisa Bernstein, Celia Fassberg, Avery Katz, Emily Kadens, and Charles
Donahue, as well as the other participants in the Symposium, The Empirical and Theoretical
Undepinningsof the Law Merchant, The University of Chicago Law School (Oct 16-17, 2003).
See, for example, Klaus Peter Berger, The Creeping Codification of the Lex Mercatoria 10-14, 32-33
(Kluwer Law Intl 1999). As will be discussed below, lex mercatoria has been said to serve other
purposes.
See id; Charles Donahue, Jr., Medieval and Early Modem Lex mercatoria: An Atemipt at the probatio
diabolica, 5 Chi J Intl L 21 (2004) (reporting this view of the lex mercatoria, but ultimately
expressing doubt as to whether the lex mercatoriaever existed as an historical matter).
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See, for example, Berger, The Creeping Codificationat 1-2 (cited in note 1).
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See, for example, Donahue, 5 Chi J Intl L at 21 (cited in note 2).
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Professor Fassberg's intriguing and excellent paper contests the connection
between the new law merchant and historical lex mercatoria in a novel,
jurisprudential manner.5 She makes the elegant point that the method of
advancing the new law merchant that is advocated by some of its most
important contemporary proponents--codification of the modern lex
meratoria-isinconsistent with these proponents' conception of the historical lex
mercatoria.Specifically, whereas the historical lex mercatoriais claimed to have been
a spontaneous creation of the merchants themselves that reflected merchant
needs and norms, codification is a product of non-merchants (mostly lawyers)
that primarily utilizes established legal techniques for identifying lex mercatoria's
content.6 Moreover, whereas the historical lex mercatoria typically is described as
having been independent of national legal systems, the substantive content of
the proposed code of lex mercatoria comprises traditional legal principles that are
found in national legal systems.
Professor Fassberg's argument is a fatal blow against the attempt to ground
the new law merchant on the precedent of a historical lex mercatoriacharacterized
as a body of spontaneous, merchant-created norms and practices that stands
apart from national legal systems. One must be careful, however, not to misread
Professor Fassberg's paper as standing for the proposition that codification isper
se incompatible with all plausible conceptions of what constituted the essential
core of the historical lex mercatoria. Indeed, a casual examination of the lex
mercatoria literature discloses three distinct goals that lex mercatoriahas been said
to advance, only one of which is undermined by Professor Fassberg's
jurisprudential argument.
Let us begin by identifying three different conceptions of what constituted
the historical lex mercatoria. First, lex mercatoria has been hailed as having
comprised novel business solutions that addressed challenges unique to
international merchants that traditional law was unable to resolve.8 Second, lex
mercatoria has been said to refer not to substantive law, but to the streamlined
dispute resolution processes that were required by itinerant merchants who
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See Celia Wasserstein Fassberg, Lex Mercatoria-Hoist with Its Own Petard?, 5 Chi J Intl L 67
(2004).
The techniques include comparative legal analysis. See, for example, Berger, The Creping
Codification at 210-11 (cited in note 1).
See Fassberg, 5 Chi J Intl L at 67 (cited in note 5).
For instance, scholars with as divergent approaches to lex mercatoria as Charles Donahue and
Emily Kadens concurred at this conference that bills of exchange were a new creation, outside the
framework of traditional sources of local law, and necessitated by the trade patterns of medieval
itinerant merchants.
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stayed only briefly in any single location.9 Third, it has been said that lex
mercatoria was the solution to the choice-of-law difficulty that otherwise would
have arisen when parties from multiple jurisdictions transacted. On this view, lex
mercatoria was a body of law distinct from any single national legal system that
governed such multi-jurisdiction transactions.'
Now consider the relationship each of these conceptions of lex mercatoria
bears to the related claims that lex mercatoria was a spontaneous creation of
merchants that stood apart from national legal systems. The notion that lex
mercatoriawas the spontaneous creation of merchants themselves-a conception
that seems inconsistent with contemporary efforts to codify a new law
merchant-has some conceptual affinity with the conception of lex mercatonia as
a source of novel substantive solutions. After all, if traditional sources of law
were unable to provide the needed solutions, it is plausible to suggest that the
solved the problems themselves," and in so doing created a body of
merchants
"law"' 2 that was independent of the state. Whether merchant law is created
spontaneously by merchants, however, is wholly irrelevant to the conception of
historical lex mercatoria as a streamlined dispute-resolution system. Similarly, if
historical lex mercatona short-circuited choice-of-law difficulties by providing a
single body of law that governed transnational transactions, then the fact that
the authors of the modern lex mercatoriaare lawyers rather than merchants does
not undercut the claim that the new law merchant is a descendent of the
historical law merchant. Moreover, as will shortly be elaborated, it is possible to
have a legal system that is both independent of national legal systems (in the
sense of being a distinct, anational body of law that applies to multi-jurisdiction
transactions, thereby eliminating choice-of-law problems) and that draws its
principles from national legal systems. 3 Accordingly, the fact that the new law
See William Jones, The Settlement of Mercantile Disputes by Merchants: An Approach to the History of
Commercial Law, presented at the Symposium, The Empirical and Theoretical Underpinnings of the Law
Merchant,The University of Chicago Law School (Oct 16-17, 2003) (on file with CJIL).
10 See, for example, Paul R. Milgrom, Douglass C. North, and Barry R. Weingast, The Role of
Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, PrivateJudges, and the ChampagneFairs,2 Econ &
Pol 1,5 (1990).
11 Of course, even within the conception of lex mercatoria as having provided novel substantive
solutions, it is not logically necessary that the solutions arose from merchants themselves.
Solutions could have come from scholars or practicing attorneys, for example.
12 1 put the term "law" in quotation marks in recognition of the fact that this might not be
understood as being real law under all schools of jurisprudence. See, for example, John Austin,
Province ofJuriprudence Determined 30 (Prometheus 2000) (" [C]ustomary laws, considered as positive
law, are not commands. And, consequently, customary laws, considered as positive law, are not
laws or rules properly so called."). This Comment declines to adopt an Austinian conception of
law.
See below at 87.
13
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merchant is drafted by lawyers and comprises legal principles drawn from
national legal systems does not necessarily mean that the new law merchant is
unrelated to the historical lex mercatoriaconceptualized as a solution to choice-oflaw quandaries.
Given the murky historical record, it might be useful to de-couple the
"historical" lex mercatonra from the contemporary law merchant and to ask two
functional questions: Is there a need for a new law merchant? If so, does
codification cut against the modern lex mercatoria's satisfaction of these wants?
Though Professor Fassberg did not aim to answer these functional questions,
her paper sheds important light on them. After explaining how, I hope to
foreclose a possible misreading of Professor Fassberg's analysis, which
(mistakenly) could be read as providing a firm "no" to the first question and a
"yes" to the second. 14
First, Professor Fassberg makes the important point that contemporary
choice-of-law doctrines almost always respect party autonomy. If the contract
indicates that the transaction is to be governed by French law, or even by an
identifiable set of rules that are not the creation of any particular country, courts
typically will honor the parties' election. 15 The target of Professor Fassberg's
comment is an important lex mercatoria proponent who has overstated the
unpredictability of contemporary choice-of-law doctrines in his effort to show a
need for a new law merchant," and her critique is well taken.
But does choice-of-laws' party autonomy principle eliminate the need for a
new law merchant as a functional matter? Not necessarily. To begin, party
autonomy has no bearing on lex mercatoria as a provider of novel substantive
solutions. If there indeed are unique problems faced by merchants that ordinary
law has not yet resolved-and I take no position on the ultimately empirical
question of whether this is so-then the private international law rules
concerning party autonomy do not undercut the need for a modern lex mercatoria.
Moreover, even if contemporary law contains all solutions to the challenges
faced by international merchants, there might be benefits to a uniform
substantive law merchant that jettisoned the need for the parties to choose
which law should apply. Unfettered choice among numerous options could lead
to high transaction costs associated with legal research (as each party tries to
identify the law most favorable to its side of the transaction) and negotiation; it
might be cheaper and more efficient if there were a single, widely recognized

15

Although a "no" to the first question technically makes the second question irrelevant, Professor
Fassberg's paper was not directed to answering the functionalist questions raised here and could
be understood as providing an answer to the second question as well as a response in the negative
to the first.
See Fassberg, 5 Chi J Intl L at 73-76 (cited in note 5).
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See id at 75 (criticizing Klaus Peter Berger).
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body of law that governed international transactions. Furthermore, there might
be information asymmetries, asymmetries in bargaining power, and the like that
counsel against a regime in which the parties to the transaction are left to
"choose the law that is to govern them."'"
Finally, there remain uncertainties as to which substantive law will be
applied under the contemporary private international law rules of party
autonomy. Nomenclature notwithstanding, private international law is a matter
8
of domestic law and accordingly varies from country to country.' Moreover, the
law of virtually all countries permits a court to refuse to apply a foreign law, even
one chosen by the parties, if enforcement would violate the "public policy" of
the jurisdiction in which the lawsuit is brought. Also, some countries require
that there be some connection between the chosen law and the forum. These
aspects of private international law generate uncertainties as to whether a body
of law selected by the parties will in fact be applied, leading to litigation and
other related inefficiencies. Such costs could be lessened, if not eliminated, if a
uniform body of substantive merchant law governed international transactions. 9
Consider next whether codification functionally undermines the benefits
that the new law merchant might provide. Professor Fassberg notes that one
prominent scholar has propounded a code that comprises seventy-eight
principles, all of which are found in national legal systems.2" Such a dependence
no doubt undermines a conception of modern lex mercatoria as the provider of
novel substantive solutions to problems unique to international merchants.2 '
That the principles are found in national systems, however, does not thwart
modern lex mercatoria's potential for providing a uniform substantive law that

17

For what may appear to be a contrary view that stresses the efficiency benefits of party autonomy
in domestic choice of law, see Erin A. O'Brien and Larry E. Ribstein, From Poktics to Effidengy in
Choice ofLaw, 67 U Chi L Rev 1151 (2000). O'Brien and Ribstein's analysis, however, compares
the costs of party autonomy against the costs of a system in which there are multiple systems of
law that potentially could govern, not only one (as would be the case with lex mercatoia). For that
reason, their analysis would not appear to bear upon the present discussion.
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The description of international choice-of-law principles that follows in this paragraph is drawn
from Professor Fassberg's clear description of the black letter law of private international law. See
Fassberg, 5 Chi J Intl L at 73-76 (cited in note 5).
It is less likely that any single country would find that such a body of law violated its public policy.
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See Fassberg, 5 ChiJ Intl L at 79 n 35 (cited in note 5).

21

Codification has an uncertain effect on lex mercatoria understood as a system of streamlined
dispute resolution. If the decisionmakers viewed the code as a checklist of factors that might be
taken into account, then codification need not complicate the decisionmaking process. On the
other hand, streamlined resolution would suffer if decisionmakers labored to determine how the
competing principles found in the list ought to be harmonized and sought to create a system of
precedent so as to obtain consistent results across disputes.
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short-circuits the choice-of-law challenges that otherwise would inhere in such
multi-jurisdiction transactions. 22
This might seem paradoxical. One might ask, "How could a list of
principles derived from national legal systems be the basis for the creation of a
body of uniform substantive law that stands apart from national legal systems
such that it could be the anational law that governs transnational transactions?"
The answer is that what characterizes a substantive legal system is not just
the principles it endorses, but the scope that is given to each principle. The latter
includes how competing principles are harmonized when they come into conflict
with one another. For instance, while the legal systems of both Germany and
the United States contain free speech principles, the scope of this principle is far
broader in the US.23 For an example closer to home, consider the Indian Civil
Rights Act ("ICRA").24 Although the United States Constitution does not apply
to Indian tribes, the ICRA imposes statutory limitations on tribal governments
that track the language of the Bill of Rights. The United States Supreme Court
has held, however, that tribal courts are not bound by federal courts'
interpretations of the Bill of Rights when the tribal courts construe the ICRA.
The substantive limitations to which tribes are subject accordingly are different
from those that apply to state governments. As such, the legal system that
governs tribal governments is distinct from what applies to the States despite the
fact that both are governed by legal principles that are described by identical
words ("free speech," "due process," and so forth).
From this it follows that the mere fact that a proposed codification of lex
mercatoria contains principles drawn from national legal systems does not
foreclose the possibility that the code could give rise to a distinctive legal system
that could solve the complex choice-of-law problems generated by international
mercantile activity. Of course, to say that codifying national legal norms does
not foreclose the development of a distinctive body of law merchant does not
mean that such a determinate system of law necessarily will emerge. Whether
there is a systematic definition of the principles that over time gives rise to
determinate and ascertainable duties and rights turns on whether there are

22
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24

To be sure, such a lex mercatoriawould introduce new, difficult questions such as what constitutes
a multi-jurisdictional transaction that triggered application of the lex mercatoria. On balance,
though, the benefits of a system of uniform law governing international transactions might well
outweigh the costs (once such a system of law is developed, at least).
See, for example, David P. Currie, The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany 237-43
(Chicago 1994) ("Examination of the German law of free expression reminds one once again how
easily two well-intentioned societies, starting from substantially identical premises, can arrive at
significantly different results.").
Demonstration of all that follows in this paragraph can be found in Mark D. Rosen, The Radical
Possibiliy of Limited Communioy-BasedInterpretationof the Constitution,43 Wm & Mary L Rev 927, 93641 (2002).
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institutions that are capable of translating the general principles into determinate
requirements. Unfortunately, the principal advocate for codifying a modern lex
mercatoriadoes not appear to have taken account of this very important fact.2"
Finally, it is essential to make clear that the discussion here should not be
understood as suggesting that codification of a new law merchant at this point in
time is desirable. I simply am showing that codification is not per se inconsistent
with a new law merchant. Whether codification at this time is wise is an entirely
different question that lies far beyond this brief Comment's scope.26

To return to the questions that compose this Comment's title, it would
appear that neither codification nor the party-autonomy principles of private
international law preclude a role for a new law merchant. Although lawyer-led
codification is inconsistent with lex mercatoria understood as a spontaneous
creation of merchants themselves, codification is not inconsistent with a law
merchant that constitutes a solution to international choice-of-law problems or
that serves as a streamlined dispute resolution mechanism. Nor do the
contemporary party-autonomy principles found in private international law
obviate the need for a new law merchant that could provide a single, determinate
body of law governing international transactions. This is the case because party
autonomy is not always respected; the extent to which it is respected still varies
from country to country; and even if party autonomy were always respected, a
uniform body of substantive law might be preferable to a regime under which
merchants can choose the law that is to govern their transaction. Moreover, it is
possible that a modern lex mercatoria is needed to solve problems peculiar to
international merchants that have not been adequately addressed by national
legal systems.
In the end, though both history and jurisprudence illuminate many facets
of lex mercatoria,neither can answer the question of whether a new law merchant
is desirable from a functional perspective. Answering that turns on hard empirics
of a sort one would not expect to find in a paper such as Professor Fassberg's
(much less a commentary such as this), but that would appropriately be found in
27
the scholarly books that advocate the development of a modern lex mercatoria.

26

See Berger, The Creeping Codification at 206-29 (cited in note 1) (advancing his proposal that lex
mercatoriabe codified without taking into account such institutional considerations).
For a discussion of the merits and demerits of codification, as well as an explanation of four
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different types of codifications, see Mark D. Rosen, What Has Happened to the Common
Law?-Recent American Codifications, and Their Impact on Judicial Pratice and the Law's Subsequent
Development, 1994 Wis L Rev 1119.
Surprisingly, advocates of a new law merchant have not produced such evidence. See, for

25

example, Berger, The Creeping Codficaion at 9-17 (cited in note 1). In fact, there is evidence that is
arguably to the contrary: "A recent worldwide survey among attorneys active in international
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Should a need for a new law merchant be established, much careful work
remains in determining the best approach to develop the modern lex mercatoria.
While advocates of the new law merchant can rest assured that the codification
they have suggested is not flatly incompatible with lex mercatoria, this by no
means amounts to a ringing endorsement of the attempt to codify a new law
merchant at this time. At the very least, advocates of codification must be certain
that there are institutions in place that can systematically particularize the
application of the various general principles that compose the new law merchant
so that the new law merchant can be developed into a comprehensive and
determinate system over time.

commercial law has revealed that most of them would strongly advise against including a
provision in the contract of their client referring to the lex mercatoria as the lex contractus." Id at
5. Perhaps this is because the lex mercatoria is not sufficiently definite and developed at this point
in time. Id. Or perhaps this is because lex mercatoria is not necessary today.
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